Paper for the Conference on Cultural Diversity, Paris, 2-4 February 2003
Professor
Jane Kelsey, University of Auckland, New Zealand
In 1984 the newly elected Labour (social democratic) Government launched a radical free market programme of deregulation, trade liberalization, corporatization, privatization and fiscal austerity that had dramatic impacts on the media and especially on public broadcasting. These policies were extended by a National (conservative) Government through the 1990s. In 1999 Labour was re-elected, this time advocating a classic Third Way programme to extend globalization and restore a ‘nation building’ role and commercial viability to New Zealand’s cultural sector. The contradiction intrinsic to this approach is reflected in the conflict between Labour’s policy of compulsory local content broadcasting quotas and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
In 1988 New Zealand’s state-owned broadcasting service was divided into two fully commercial companies - Radio New Zealand and Television New Zealand (TVNZ). They were required by law to run as successful private sector businesses and return a dividend to the government. Both were opened to competition. The Radio Communications Act 1989 saw radio frequencies put out to tender. Television 3 was established as a privately owned ‘free to air’ channel to compete with the two channels of TVNZ. Sky Television established three subscriber channels. The Minister of Broadcasting at the time boasted that New Zealand had the most open communications market in the world.
Under the new regime, all branches of state-owned broadcasting became profit-driven. Revenue from the government-levied broadcasting fee provided only 15 percent of TVNZ’s revenue by 1989. (A campaign against this ‘tax’ eventually saw the broadcasting fee abolished in 1999, and what remained of public broadcasting became dependent on its commercial revenue and direct and indirect[1] funding from the government of the day.)
Specific restrictions on overseas ownership and cross-ownership of the media were quickly removed. Ownership became concentrated into the hands of an increasingly foreign few.[2] This was problematic in itself, but it also increased the potential for challenges by foreign owners under the WTO and other regional and bilateral free trade and investment agreements.
The consolidation of control in a few international players, and the decline of commitment to New Zealand content, is a story that is familiar to many countries. TV3 was originally part-New Zealand owned. But it was heavily undercut by TVNZ and forced into receivership. The Canadian part-owners bought out the remaining shares. It is now controlled by CanWest Global Communications Corporation, a part owner of the Ten Network in Australia and with links in Chile and the UK. In 1997 CanWest also established a national commercial, entertainment-based channel TV4 that has no news or current affairs. During 1999 the two CanWest channels showed no new local drama or comedy shows. Following significant losses CanWest put TV3 and TV4 on the market, but a recent return to profitability has seen this decision reversed.
In 1998 Australian-owned Prime Television began broadcasting into the five largest ‘markets’ in New Zealand, carrying local news and commercials and Australian programming. A deal with Kerry Packer’s Publishing and Broadcasting Ltd in late 2001 saw the Nine Network in Australia take over Prime’s programming, effectively broadcasting an Australian channel free-to-air in New Zealand. Its mass-market approach has made it a major competitor for state-owned TV2 and CanWest’s TV3.
Sky Television in New Zealand was launched by wealthy New Zealanders, but later became majority-owned by a US conglomerate of Bell Atlantic, Ameritech, Time-Warner and Telecommunications Inc, with TVNZ holding minority shares. It is currently 66% owned by the Murdoch-controlled Independent Newspapers Ltd (INL). INL also shares control over New Zealand’s print media with Wilson and Horton, owned by Tony O’Reilly’s Independent Newspapers Plc (INP). In 2001 they owned between them 82% (by circulation) of New Zealand’s main provincial daily newspapers and 93% of the daily metropolitan papers.
In a determined attempt to corner the market Sky Television has secured ownership of about 86% of available South Island frequencies, but it uses only 40%. It has successfully lobbied the Government to secure a 10-year deal to have TVNZ broadcast both TV1 and TV2 through Sky’s digital network. This effectively gives Sky monopoly control of digital services. The Broadcasting Minister has raised the possibility of regulating Sky’s digital platform if it does not ensure access for all broadcasters.
In radio, the process of commercialization devastated Radio New Zealand, which had to be bailed out in 1991. It was commercially restructured in 1992. In April 1996 the Government sold the 41 commercial stations of state-owned Radio New Zealand, the Radio Bureau (an advertising production studio) and Radio New Zealand Sport to the New Zealand Radio Network Ltd. The buyer was owned equally by Wilson and Horton (then 100% INP-owned), Australian Provincial Newspapers (25% INP-owned) and Clear Channel Communications (the latter two being joint owners of the eight-station Australian Radio Network). Later that year Radio Network Ltd bought the Prospect radio network. It now has control of 53 stations and more than 50% of radio advertising in New Zealand. Its chief competitor is CanWest’s Radio Works, with about 48% revenue share. Only the National Programme and the Concert Programme remain non-commercial and state owned.
These changes had a dramatic impact on local content. Removal of the non-commercial role for public broadcasting in 1988 meant minimal protection for local programmes and the local industry. Overseas influence was already putting pressure on local and ‘minority’ programming before deregulation, but this rapidly got worse once public broadcasting was corporatized.[3] In a small competitive market, with limited audience elasticity and advertising growth, the media began to focus on the lowest common denominator. Television became deluged by US soap operas, sit-coms and talk shows which bore little resemblance to the diversity of New Zealand life. Programmes that were called ‘local’ included foreign-formatted quiz shows and locally fronted, but foreign made, current affairs documentaries and cartoons. The limited local production that survived depended on competitive bidding by programme makers through New Zealand on Air, with no guarantee of airplay. A survey of 11 OECD countries in 1999 showed New Zealand had the lowest local content on television, with 24%.[4] Almost all regional television also became foreign owned and the tradition of broadcasting local content for local communities effectively died.
Niche options, notably Maori radio, have delivered some more positive outcomes. Iwi (indigenous) radio stations are providing valuable conduits for Maori language, music, news and political critique. A successful claim to the Waitangi Tribunal (established to review breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi between the English Crown and Maori leaders in 1840), and several court cases, have seen Maori secure preferential access to the privatized radio spectrum and increased funding for Maori broadcasting.[5] But the government-constructed funding vehicle was designed to boost their ability to operate in the commercial broadcasting market, with no guarantee of airtime. Very little Maori content is currently heard or seen in private or public broadcasting. A first attempt to establish a Maori television channel in the late 1990s collapsed amidst accusations of mismanagement. A second attempt is almost a year behind schedule, with the Government rejecting proposals for it to secure wide coverage by broadcasting through CanWest’s TV4. The channel is now expected to be on air by mid-2003, but operating through the less comprehensive and more costly medium of UHF.
There has also been a strong ideological dimension to this transition. For example, the Sky Television operation was founded by major funders and proponents of New Zealand’s New Right agenda. CanWest’s major shareholder Izzy Asper has also been a vocal supporter of New Zealand’s radical free market policies and promoted them in Canada. CanWest’s exercise of editorial control over its the Canadian newspapers has been extremely controversial. In New Zealand CanWest’s radio arm has been criticized by the Broadcasting Standards Authority (BSA) for its non-cooperation and the Broadcasting Minister threatened to increase the BSA’s powers to deal with that situation.
Today, TVNZ remains state-owned, although its sale has been proposed periodically. In 2001 the Government moved to implement its new vision for broadcasting by introducing an amendment to the Television New Zealand Act. If passed, this will remove the requirement that TVNZ operates solely on the basis of commercial considerations and change its organizational form. The Bill also contains a new Charter that includes requirements for the company to ‘feature programming across all genres that informs, entertains and educates New Zealand audiences’; ‘provide shared experiences that contribute to a sense of citizenship and national identity’; ‘ensure in its programmes and programme planning the participation of Maori and the presence of a significant Maori voice’; ‘support and promote the talents and creative resources of New Zealanders and of the New Zealand film and television industry’.[6] TVNZ is required to follow the Charter in its programming. The Government has agreed to fund the Charter at NZ$12 million a year. It will be interesting to find out whether and how they have assessed the GATS implications of this measure.
At the 1999 election the Labour Party also campaigned on a policy of introducing compulsory local content quotas. Lengthy delays reflected strong corporate opposition to the policy and legal concerns over conflicts with New Zealand’s audio-visual commitments under the GATS and the Closer Economic Relations free trade agreement with Australia. In December 2002, the Minister for Broadcasting finally announced the formation of a television industry group to develop ‘voluntary targets’ for New Zealand programming for free-to-air television networks. This follows a similar voluntary Code of Practice adopted by commercial radio.
However, this ‘voluntary’ commitment involves only TNVZ and TV3. Their competitors, the Packer-controlled Prime and CanWest’s TV4 are not included. If TV3 suffers a serious competitive disadvantage it could well decide to withdraw from the arrangement. The Government’s only real leverage is over state-owned TVNZ, which it still requires to be commercially competitive. If the voluntary approach fails, the Government’s options are to abandon the policy or to legislate. Legislation would have the benefit of being more difficult t change than voluntary arrangements if there was a change of government or a retreat from Labour’s current ‘nation building’ philosophy. Indeed, the Government has threatened to resort to legislation if the voluntary approach fails. But doing so would run head-on into the GATS.
Negotiating
New Zealand’s 1994 GATS Commitments
New Zealand’s domestic deregulation of broadcasting coincided with the negotiation of the GATS from the later 1980s to 1994. The history of New Zealand’s GATS negotiations on audio-visual services are helpfully detailed in a note prepared in 1999 for the Ministry of Commerce[7] which had responsibility for the (de-)regulation of broadcasting and communications.[8] The following account is drawn from that note and related source documents.
The Ministry’s note records that the GATS negotiations were pursued by New Zealand officials with ‘considerable enthusiasm’, reflecting a growing interest in opportunities for New Zealand services companies and to build collateral for the agricultural negotiations.
The first draft ‘offer’ prepared by officials in late 1990 included in the audio-visual commitments:
(a) a ‘modest’ limitation on foreign ownership of 15% for radio and television, with ministerial discretion to allow 25% foreign ownership for radio;
(b) restriction on the use of the radio spectrum by foreign governments;
(c) controls on shortwave and satellite broadcasting;
(d) limiting subsidies for production/distribution/exhibition and broadcasting to New Zealand persons and companies;
(e) national treatment limitations for local television and radio quotas;
(f) controls on broadcasting by overseas persons; and
(g) 100% tax write-offs for investment in production of New Zealand films.
Specifically on the question of quotas the officials advised that: ‘The reference to tv and radio quotas should remain. Although there are no legal requirements for quotas at present, this is not to say this will be the case in the future’.
In 1991 officials reported pressure from Canada to carve-out culture in the Exemptions Article and from the European Commission (EC) for an Annex that would exempt cultural services from the most-favoured nation (MFN) obligation to treat services suppliers from all foreign countries equally. New Zealand joined the US in opposing these proposals.
Subsequently, the Ministry of Commerce produced a new draft schedule for consideration by the Minister of Communications. This reflected the de-regulatory status quo. Accordingly, the limitations for quotas and foreign ownership had been removed. Their memo suggested that: ‘Nevertheless you may wish to consider whether it would be desirable to include such areas to protect New Zealand’s future options’. The Minister chose not to do so and endorsed the draft. The new draft of the reservations read:
(a) Allocation of a certain proportion of the Broadcasting Commission budget to Maori programming;
(b) Government assistance to the film industry through the Film Commission was limited to New Zealand films;
(c) 100% tax write-offs for investment in production of New Zealand films.
In another memorandum to the Cabinet, trade officials advised that the proposed wording on foreign investment ‘prevents us from making the regime more restrictive in the future, for example by reintroducing the recently removed restrictions on investment in broadcasting, without negotiating adequate compensatory adjustments elsewhere’.
By 1993 the US, under pressure from lobbyists such as the American Motion Picture Association, was threatening not to sign the GATS if more commitments on audio-visual were not forthcoming. Japan was also aggressive, reflecting its significant investment in the US industry. New Zealand’s offer was seen as exemplary.
In the next revamp of New Zealand’s schedule a limited commitment on the movement of persons was added, to the effect that a ‘special procedure applies to granting visas to entertainers, performing artists and associated support personnel for work purposes’. In a rare example of concern for the domestic implications of the GATS, that entry was subsequently spelt out in a lengthy list of guidelines that referred to the balancing of various interests, including:
‘(a) reasonable protection for the employment opportunities of New Zealanders;
(b) encouragement of the development of the indigenous entertainment industry;
(c)interest of the public (and the entertainment industry) in seeing what the world has to offer in entertainment and stimulation by new ideas and diversity from overseas;
(d) attracting overseas investment and promoting New Zealand as a tourist destination;
(e) access to employment opportunities abroad for New Zealand artists’.
That expanded and ‘balanced’ wording did not survive and a more limited reference to ‘special procedures for granting visas’ was restored.
The revised schedule was signed off by the Cabinet in December 1993 and specifically cleared by the then Prime Minister. Again, the memorandum from officials explained explicitly that: ‘This commitment would preclude certain policy options such as the introduction of compulsory local content requirements. Should we pursue a more restrictive approach in these areas, we would be breaking our GATS obligations and would be exposed to dispute settlement procedures – and possibly the requirement to offer compensatory benefits in other areas. . . Once engrossed, they will become binding legal commitments at international law. They will effectively lock in the present state of openness of these services sectors’.
New Zealand’s final sector-specific
schedule made full commitments to market access in Modes 1 (cross border
supply), 2 (consumption abroad) and 3 (commercial presence) for production,
distribution, exhibition and broadcasting of audiovisual works. A similar
national treatment commitment was subject to the right to allocate 6% of the
Broadcasting Commission budget for Maori programming and to provide assistance
to the New Zealand film industry through the New Zealand Film
Commission.
Audio-visual services remained unbound in Mode 4 (movement of personnel) aside from the limited commitment whereby New Zealand promised to maintain its then policy to set a special procedure for visas for entertainment workers, promoters and producers.
An MFN reservation also allowed
preferential treatment on financing and tax concessions and simplified access
to service suppliers from Canada, France, the UK and ‘any other country where cultural cooperation might be
desirable’ and which was prepared to provide reciprocal treatment.
In
1998 the Ministry of Commerce commissioned a legal opinion on the legality of
local content quotas under the GATS from a former legal advisor to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and Trade.[9]
This was apparently prompted by proposals from the National Government’s
Minister of Culture to introduce compulsory local content broadcasting quotas.
The
opinion drew on the Ministry’s historical account of the GATS negotiations and
concluded that compulsory local content quotas would clearly breach New
Zealand’s GATS commitments on market access by imposing a numerical restriction
on the market and national treatment (non-discrimination) by giving preference
to the domestic industry. The opinion also reviewed the conformity of four
other options with the GATS.
Option 1, to provide support for programmes about New Zealand, but give foreign providers equal opportunities to make them, was seen as a de facto preference for New Zealand producers, thereby breaching the national treatment rule. It would also in practice squeeze the amount of normal television programming that foreign suppliers could compete for, in breach of the market access rule. Both these propositions are debatable, especially as this is how NZ on Air currently operates, and no complaints have been laid even though there was no protection for NZ on Air in its GATS schedule.
Option 2 was to provide subsidies only to New Zealand interests. This would only be permitted under the GATS if the government had reserved the right to use subsidies in this way, which it had not.
Option 3 was to support production of New Zealand-produced material but not require it to be shown in New Zealand. Again, this was seen as, de facto, placing foreign services and suppliers at a competitive disadvantage, hence a breach of national treatment. It would also be viewed as a subsidy-type measure and disallowed, except for Maori programmes.
Option 4 – the one which the Government
has since adopted– was to operate quotas voluntarily through private entities.
The legal opinion considered that even this could be deemed an anti-competitive
practice which restricts trade in broadcasting services. Other WTO member
governments could demand consultations with the New Zealand government about
stopping it. However sanctions would be limited.
The
tension between the GATS and local content quotas came to a head after the new
Labour-led Government was elected in late 1999. As part of its commitment to
nation building and promoting New Zealand culture and cultural industries, the
Labour Party had campaigned on the reintroduction of compulsory local content
quotas for free-to-air broadcasting. The new Government was quickly advised
that such measures would breach the market access and national treatment
provisions of the GATS (as well as the Closer Economic Relations agreement
between Australia and New Zealand, which is a further complication to story).
This advice was backed by the Ministry of Commerce’s legal opinion.
The
initial response from the then Broadcasting Minister implied that the
Government would proceed anyway: ‘New
Zealand culture is more important than the agreements’.[10]
Prime Minister and Minister for Culture Helen Clark was subsequently more
circumspect:
We have
unilaterally disarmed ourselves on trade but very few others have been so
foolish. We’re now left with perfectly legitimate calls for local content and
people saying ‘You can’t do that because of Gats’. This seems a bit ridiculous
so we’re just working out the best way to handle it.[11]
The
Government’s dilemma has been intensified by the decision to maintain a strong
commitment to trade liberalization. The primary focus of trade negotiations and
the Trade Minister remains, as it was throughout the Uruguay Round, on
agriculture. This agenda goes beyond the WTO to other multilateral, regional
and bilateral agreements on trade in services and a non-binding obligation
under APEC to deliver free trade in services by 2010.
The
Government did try to avoid compounding its dilemma in a free trade and
investment agreement (Closer Economic Partnership) that it signed with
Singapore in 2001. New Zealand’s services commitments on ‘Production,
distribution, exhibition and broadcasting of audiovisual works’ were limited to
motion picture projection services. The exceptions for NZ Film Commission
subsidies and Maori programmes were dropped, as they were no longer relevant.
But this more limited commitment is purely symbolic; the GATS overrides any
lesser commitments in a bilateral agreement.
The Government seems to have adopted a strategy that manages the broadcasting quota issue as an isolated problem and proceeds with services liberalization in other sectors as part of its broader globalization programme.[12] As mentioned above, it has secured an agreement from several of the free-to-air television networks to develop voluntary targets (quotas) and “identify genres that need particular emphasis”. This complements a Government-promoted voluntary Code of Practice adopted by commercial radio. The current Broadcasting Minister described this as “a far preferable mechanism” to compulsory quotas. However, he has also assured the industry that the Government reserves the right to legislate if necessary. How, or indeed whether, Labour would so remains unclear.
Very
recently there have been signs of tension within the Cabinet over the GATS. In
December 2002 the Minister of Trade Negotiations insisted on National Radio
that the GATS poses no threat to New Zealand’s domestic policies or regulatory
powers. Prime Minister Helen Clark openly contradicted him: ‘A lot of these concerns are valid and it’s a matter of regret that in
the 1990s the previous National Government entered no reservation in acceding
to GATS on the issue of culture.’[13] However, this wording implies that the
Government has no plans to alter its GATS commitments, even though the Prime
Minister acknowledges the validity of concerns about them.
There
are two paths the Government could take - either (i) implement the quotas and
see whether any WTO member lodges a complaint or (ii) seek to modify or
withdraw the relevant commitments under the GATS and address any objections if
they are raised. In either case, the Government would be expected to offer a
‘compensatory adjustment’ in the form of further liberalisation of other
aspects of services, goods or agriculture to any WTO member government whose
audio-visual services providers could show they were disadvantaged. The value
of the adjustment would be equivalent to the value of lost ‘trade’ in
audio-visual services – a highly subjective assessment. Because New Zealand’s
GATS commitments are already extensive, compensatory adjustments could be
difficult and might simply shift the present dilemma to another service, such
as postal services or education. If the Government failed to provide equivalent
compensation to the satisfaction of affected governments, and they lodged a
complaint, New Zealand could face sanctions against its exports to those
countries to an equivalent value, something that other services ‘exporters’ and
certainly the country’s farmers would object to.
On the other hand, these risks need to be
seen in perspective.
First, another WTO member would have to
complain about the policy. Given that the quotas policy is on the USTR’s hit
list, and the precedent value such a move would set, it does seem likely that
the US would complain. Canada and Australia, as the home countries of those who
control most of New Zealand’s broadcast media, might also be persuaded by their
companies to step in.
Second, they would need to mount a
successful argument before a WTO disputes panel. That, too, would probably not
be difficult.
Third, those governments would need to
show a tangible loss to their audio-visual firms. That might pose two problems.
The value of any such loss may be relatively insignificant, and not justify the
cost of bringing the dispute. That would, in turn, make the complainants look
purely vindictive. Such a complaint might well become a cause célébre and fuel
mounting international opposition to the GATS.
Finally, even if a complaint did proceed
and a disputes panel found against New Zealand, the risk of significant
sanctions being authorised seems minimal – especially when measured against the
impact on exporters of rapid fluctuations in the New Zealand exchange rate.
So, technically, the Government does have
options. It just does not have the political will to use them. The challenge is
to create the political space where these options become not just possible, but
politically desirable. To achieve that, we need to intensify the tensions
within the Cabinet and the government generally. That requires a sense of
outrage from the cultural sector and the public at large over the impacts on
cultural diversity and democratic governance, and the trading off of culture
against the holy grail of free trade in agriculture. The politics of embarrassment
must also be employed, highlighting the hypocrisy of the New Zealand
government’s requests to Europe in audio-visual and entertainment services,
which the European Commissioner yesterday described as aggressive and
perplexing.
Tactically, the strength of opinion in
Australia over the requirement in the CER agreement from them to treat New
Zealand content as local, and the New Zealand Government’s current policies,
means there is real potential to renegotiate that agreement to exclude cultural
services. This would create an important precedent that such commitments can
indeed be reversed. We also need to
fight to exclude culture from any new bilateral agreements, such as those
currently being negotiated with Hong Kong, Chile and Mexico.
Initiatives such as the International
Declaration on Cultural Diversity which is being advanced through this
conference can provide an important opening to move the debate from opposition
to the promotion of positive and constructive alternatives.
In all developing this strategy we need to
bear in mind the complicated nature of ‘trade in cultural services’. In
addition to audio-visual services, there are subsectors that cover printing and
publishing, entertainment, and libraries museums and archives. Current GATS negotiations
to develop ‘disciplines’ on domestic regulation, subsidies and government
procurement of services, and pressure to negotiate WTO agreements on investment
and competition, pose equally potent threats.
We should also remember that this is not
just about cultural services. Other services, such as education, health, postal
delivery, banks or tourism, all perform vital roles of community integration
and social wellbeing. Alliances with those who are fighting the application of
GATS rules to those and similar sectors can strengthen the demands for the
protection of cultural diversity and a nation’s cultural services.
The short-term target is to stop new
‘offers’ being made on 31 March 2003. Beyond that, we have a longer-term
challenge to build an international movement that can paralyse further
negotiations, delegitimize the notion of free trade in services and draw the
teeth of such agreements at the WTO and elsewhere.
Ultimately, this is question of who
controls our country’s services, in whose interests, according to what
principles and priorities. The idea that the GATS locks the door forever on
this question must not be allowed to become a self-fulfilling prophecy.[14]
Footnotes:
1. Mainly through agreeing to profits being
retained in the company.
2. For a recent analysis of the position see
Bill Rosenberg, 'News media ownership in New Zealand',
http://canterbury.cyberplace.co.nz/community/CAFCA/publications/Miscellaneous/index.html
3. For an analysis of shifts between 1978
and 1992 see Joe Atkinson, 'The State, the Media and Thin Democracy', in Andrew
Sharp (ed.) The Changing Role of the State in New Zealand since 1984, Auckland:
Auckland University Press, 1994 quoting research by Avon Adams. See also J.
Farnsworth, 'Mainstream or Minority: Ambiguities in State or Market
Arrangements for New Zealand television', in John Deeks and Nick Perry, (eds)
Controlling Interests: Business, the State and Society in New Zealand,
Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1992
4. New Zealand on Air, 'Broadcasting and
Cultural Issues at the Start of the New Millennium',
www.nzonair.govt.nz/media/policyandresearch/otherpublications/issues.pdf
5. The privatization of broadcasting has been
challenged by Maori in numerous court cases; e.g. Attorney-General v. New
Zealand Maori Council, [1991] 2 NZLR 129; New Zealand Maori Council v.
Attorney-General, [1992] 2 NZLR 576; New Zealand Maori Council v
Attorney-General, [1994] 1 NZLR 513; Waitangi Tribunal, Radio Spectrum
Management and Development: Interim report, (WAI-776), Waitangi Tribunal,
Wellington, March 1999.
6. Section 16 Television New Zealand
Amendment Bill 2001
7. Since renamed the Ministry for Economic
Development.
8. 'Historical Note on the Consideration
Given in New Zealand to the "Audio-visual Services" Sector of NZ's
"Schedule of Specific Commitments" under the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS)", undated, Comms/Int 55/4, 55/2
9. 'Question of a "Local Content
Quota" ', a legal opinion prepared for the Ministry of Commerce by Tony
Small, 28 August 1998
10. New Zealand Herald, 21 January 2000
11. New Zealand Herald, 10 April 2000
12. Education exports become an especially
important source of revenue, although there are signs that the problems GATS
poses for New Zealand's education system are reluctantly being recognized
13. 'Morning Report', Radio New Zealand, 6
December 2002
14. Equally difficult questions would arise
if New Zealand attempted to restore greater control of foreign ownership of
broadcasting. Even the limited threats to re-regulate Sky's digital monopoly or
strengthen Broadcasting Standards Authority powers might run foul of the
domestic regulation Article VI.4 in the GATS; that risk would be heightened if
current proposals for more extensive and intrusive 'disciplines' on domestic
regulation were to be adopted.
[1] Mainly through agreeing to profits being
retained in the company.
[2] For a recent analysis of the position see
Bill Rosenberg, ‘News media ownership in New Zealand’, http://canterbury.cyberplace.co.nz/community/CAFCA/publications/Miscellaneous/index.html
[3] For an
analysis of shifts between 1978 and 1992 see Joe Atkinson, ‘The State, the
Media and Thin Democracy’, in Andrew Sharp (ed.) The Changing Role of the State in New Zealand since 1984, Auckland:
Auckland University Press, 1994 quoting research by Avon Adams. See also J.
Farnsworth, ‘Mainstream or Minority: Ambiguities in State or Market
Arrangements for New Zealand television’, in John Deeks and Nick Perry, (eds) Controlling Interests: Business, the State
and Society in New Zealand, Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1992
[4]New Zealand on Air, ‘Broadcasting and
Cultural Issues at the Start of the New Millennium’,
www.nzonair.govt.nz/media/policyandresearch/otherpublications/issues.pdf
[5] The
privatisation of broadcasting has been challenged by Maori in numerous court
cases; e.g. Attorney-General v. New
Zealand Maori Council, [1991] 2 NZLR 129; New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney-General, [1992] 2 NZLR 576; New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General,
[1994] 1 NZLR 513; Waitangi Tribunal, Radio
Spectrum Management and Development: Interim report, (WAI-776), Waitangi
Tribunal, Wellington, March 1999.
[6] Section 16
Television New Zealand Amendment Bill 2001
[7] Since renamed the Ministry for Economic
Development.
[8] ‘Historical
Note on the Consideration Given in New Zealand to the “Audio-visual Services”
Sector of NZ’s “Schedule of Specific Commitments” under the General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS)”, undated, Comms/Int 55/4, 55/2
[9]‘Question of a “Local Content Quota” ‘, a legal opinion prepared for the
Ministry of Commerce by Tony Small, 28 August 1998
[10] New Zealand Herald, 21 January 2000
[11] New Zealand Herald, 10 April 2000
[12] Education exports become an especially important source of revenue, although there are signs that the problems GATS poses for New Zealand’s education system are reluctantly being recognized.
[13] ‘Morning
Report’, Radio New Zealand, 6 December 2002
[14] Equally difficult questions would arise if
New Zealand attempted to restore greater control of foreign ownership of
broadcasting. Even the limited threats to re-regulate Sky’s digital monopoly or
strengthen Broadcasting Standards Authority powers might run foul of the
domestic regulation Article VI.4 in the GATS; that risk would be heightened if
current proposals for more extensive and intrusive ‘disciplines’ on domestic
regulation were to be adopted.