13 September 2003
Bulletin #8
It’s hard to imagine a more blatant
provocation than the draft ministerial text produced by the Chair of the
ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organization in Cancun, Mexico today.
The organization is already reeling under allegations of bullying and bias, and
challenges from poorer countries to the negotiating agenda that was set down
through a similarly undemocratic process in Doha in 2001.
That meeting launched the so-called Doha
‘Development’ Round of talks that aims to extend the World Trade Organization's
free trade rules. The round came unstuck
long ago. By the time the Cancun meeting began on 10 September all the deadlines
set at the Doha ministerial in 2001 had been missed. This included issues of
concern to poorer countries that were supposed to have priority.
The US and European Union, supported by
the WTO Secretariat and chairs of various negotiating committees, continued to
assume they had the right to dictate the trade rules for the world. By Cancun,
the level of anger among poorer governments over the substance and process of
the negotiations had reached boiling point. But it was not clear how this would
translate into action.
That became clear early on the first day.
A press conference called by the Group of 20 ‘developing’ and ‘least developed’
countries to present their farm proposals had to be shifted from a small
briefing room to the main auditorium to accommodate everyone. Brazil, as the
rotating chair, firmly staked out their challenge to a draft ministerial text
that the Chair and Director General had prepared, based on a self-serving paper
tabled by the EU and US. The air was electric. At the end, journalists
applauded. After years of being humiliated, intimidated and marginalized, the
poorer countries were fighting back.
Next day came equally vehement opposition
to negotiations on the ‘Singapore issues’ of investment, competition,
government procurement and trade facilitation. At the end of the Doha
ministerial meeting in 2001, India had resolutely insisted on an explicit
consensus at Cancun before any negotiations could begin. This time, standing
alongside India were 71 of the WTO’s 146 member countries, including China,
India, the Carribean Community and the Least Developed Countries. Reporting
from their meeting, Malaysia’s forthright trade minister Rafidah Aziz insisted
that “there is no consensus.”
As the days passed it became clear that
the US and EU were no longer dictating the shots, and they did not like it.
Governments they saw as recalcitrant were threatened with loss of trade
preferences, cancellation of bilateral negotiations and cuts to aid funding.
Larger governments, such as India, China and Brazil, were accused of promoting
their own interests at the expense of poorer countries, in a brazen attempt to
divide and rule. The US launched an
extraordinary attack on Brazil for leading a “coalition of paralysers”, saying
it was wasting its time in revitalizing the struggle of the seventies and
creating a north-south divide. Brazilian President Lula reportedly received
four calls from US President Bush yesterday. Brazil’s short dignified response
affirmed that: “We are reaching the final days of the Cancun Ministerial. It is
even more important, at this stage, that we concentrate our efforts in trying
to negotiate and not direct our energies at attacking countries or groups of
countries.”
Against this backdrop, today’s draft text
and the remainder of the meeting was always going to be critical to the long
term prospects of the WTO. If it failed to recognize the concerns of the
majority of WTO members and yet again favoured the interests of the richer industrialized
countries, there was a risk of a major backlash, a further loss of legitimacy
and even a walkout from the ministerial. Yet that is precisely the approach
that was taken.
The draft ministerial text on agriculture
did nothing to address the two primary demands for reduction of domestic
supports and export subsidies called for by the majority of poorer countries.
Instead, it would allow richer countries to continue their subsidies and
dumping, while requiring poorer ones as to make drastic tariff cuts.
It also provided a definitive time line
to negotiate a multilateral investment treaty and mandated negotiations on
government procurement and trade facilitation. The timeline for the investment
negotiations was tied to that for finalizing the modalities on agriculture and
industrial goods, creating the negotiating space for major powers to demand
trade offs. No one pretended there was any explicit consensus on which to
justify those mandates.
Proposals for tariff cuts on industrial
goods risked depriving poor countries of their primary source of income and
leaving their fledgling industrial base and balance of payments at the mercy of
cheap imports.
This extraordinary provocation was
possible because of a bizarre process where appointed ‘Friends of the Chair’
decided ‘in their own responsibility’ what proposals should be forwarded to the
Chair for inclusion in the ministerial text. There was no pretence that this
reflected the views of the WTO member countries and no attempt to produce a
balanced text that reflected the range of views. For an organization supposedly
based on consensus and whose processes are already facing vigorous challenges
this was an extraordinarily arrogant move.
Parallels are being drawn with what happened
at Doha in 2001. A clearly unacceptable text was sprung on government
delegations. It did not acknowledge the deeply divided views of WTO members on
most issues and favoured the interests of the major powers, especially the EU.
After a vigorous debate the text was amended in ways that addressed some of its
most offensive proposals.
That was, in turn, debated and a final
text emerged - which was worse than the original one. But there was little
governments could do.
Clearly there is an expectation from
those who are responsible for this text that poorer countries will fall into
line yet again. Some have been more moderate in their public responses than
might have been expected, notably Brazil. But the response of others has ranged
from cynicism to outrage. India’s Minister concluded, to resounding applause,
that “we have to express our disappointment that the revised text brought out
by you has arbitrarily disregarded views and concerns expressed by us. We have
so far constructively engaged in the entire post-Doha process in the hope that
this is a development round. We wonder now whether development here refers to
only further development of the developed countries. Consequently, Mr Chairman,
we feel that this text does not lend itself to any meaningful dialogue.”
Malaysia’s minister Rafidah didn’t mince
her words either. Rejecting the proposed text on the new issues in capital
letters, underlined, she concluded that “MALAYSIA CANNOT SUPPORT ANY TEXT TO
IMPLY THE COMMENCEMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS ON MODALITIES. MALAYSIA’S POSITION is NON-NEGOTIABLE
REGARDLESS OF ANY MOVE or developments IN THE OTHER ISSUES being discussed in
the Cancun Ministerial.”
The scene is set for further clashes tomorrow. Even if the major powers manage to manoeuvre through some sort of text and pretend that it is based on consensus, the WTO’s prospects for survival as the pre-eminent economic policy agency in the world are looking increasingly slim.